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Abstract
The subnational government spending in Indonesia exhibit a highly skewed distribution, i.e., it is very low in
the first two-quarters and then increases significantly in the last two-quarters. Such explosive pattern poses
two disadvantages. First, the regional output will fall below its optimal level as the low government capital
expenditure leads to a fewer provision of public goods. Second, a significant increase in government spending
in the later quarter pushes the short run aggregate demand to the northeast and creates an inflationary
pressure in the following quarters. In this study, we analyze the effect of quarterly regional government
expenditure growth on regional inflation during 2010–2014. Using Arellano Bond GMM estimation, we find
government expenditure growth leads to higher inflation in the same quarter. A percentage increase in
non-capital expenditure spending results in a higher inflation than a percentage increase in capital spending.
Keywords: Capital Spending; Non-Capital Spending; Regional Inflation; Subnational Government

Abstrak
Pengeluaran pemerintah daerah di Indonesia menunjukkan distribusi yang sangat timpang, yaitu sangat
rendah pada dua kuartal pertama dan kemudian meningkat secara significant pada dua kuartal terakhir. Pola
eksplosif tersebut menimbulkan dua kerugian. Pertama, output regional akan berada di bawah tingkat yang
optimal karena pengeluaran pembangunan (belanja kapital) pemerintah yang rendah akan mengakibatkan
rendahnya barang publik yang tersedia. Kedua, peningkatan belanja pemerintah pada kuartal terakhir akan
mengakibatkan kenaikan permintaan agregat dan mengakibatkan tekanan inflasi pada kuartal berikutnya.
Dalam studi ini, kami menganalisa dampak dari pertumbuhan pengeluaran pemerintah daerah di Indonesia
terhadap inflasi daerah periode 2010–2014. Dengan menggunakan estimasi GMM Arellano Bond, kami
menemukan pertumbuhan pengeluaran pemerintah daerah akan mengakibatkan inflasi daerah pada
kuartal yang sama. Satu persen peningkatan belanja non-kapital mengakibatkan inflasi yang lebih tinggi
dibandingkan dengan satu persen peningkatan belanja kapital.
Kata kunci: Belanja Kapital; Belanja Non-Kapital; Inflasi Daerah; Pemerintah Daerah
JEL classifications: E31; H72

1. Introduction
In analyzing the source of inflation in the longrun, economists can be categorized into two broad
school of thoughts, namely Monetarism and Structuralism (Wachter 1979). When it comes to explaining the source of inflation in the short run,
economists consider that inflation in the short run
 Corresponding Address: Program Pascasarjana Ilmu
Ekonomi, Gedung Pascasarjana Lantai 2. Jl Prof. Dr. Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo, Depok, Jawa Barat 16424 Indonesia. E-mail:
vid.adrison@ui.ac.id.

is caused by either cost-push inflation, demand-pull
inflation, or both. Cost-push inflation occurs when
there is an adverse supply shock–for instance, energy price increase–which shifts the aggregate supply to the northwest. On the other hand, demandpull inflation occurs if there is an unanticipated increased in the aggregate spending, which shifts the
aggregate demand function to the northeast.
As one of the components of aggregate spending is government expenditure, the ability to produce a stable inflation depends partly on government spending volatility. A large volatility in government spending may result in greater price in-
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stability (hence, inflation). Decentralization–a partial devolution over spending or monetary policy
to the lower level of government–is one example
of functional arrangement between the central and
subnational government that affects government
spending volatility and thus, inflation rate. Current
theoretical literature has a different prediction on
the effect of decentralization on inflation. The first
strand of literature considers inflation as a commitment problem. According to this view, policymakers
have the incentives to renege its promises to deliver
a stable monetary growth because an unanticipated
inflation has a positive effect on real output. Only
if a government can restrict their future actions will
their results be credible and a low inflation equilibrium (Treisman 2000). Consequently, decentralization may reduce inflation if it can restrict the central
government ability to renege and if the competition
among subnational jurisdictions to attract investment reduces the regional government ability to
renege (Qian & Roland 1998). The second strand
of literature considers inflation as the result of collective action problem. According to this view, stable
prices are public goods which tend to be underprovided when the number of actors who must agree to
contribute is large (Samuelson 1954). While all feel
advantages of low inflation, the public spending and
money creation are felt by particular beneficiaries.
The more actors required to contribute, the weaker
is the incentives to exercise restraint, hence result
in higher inflation.
The empirical evidence on the effect of decentralization varies, depending on what kind of decentralization is analyzed and the measure of decentralization. For instance, Huang & Sheng (2009)
found that political decentralization in China results
in higher inflation at the regional level, while Treisman (2000) using samples of 87 countries found
that political decentralization lowers inflation. On the
other hand, fiscal decentralization–when measured
from the revenue side– is associated with lower inflation (Baskaran 2012; King & Ma 2001; Neyapti
2004; Thornton 2007). When fiscal decentralization
is measured on the expenditure side, some studies
found that the higher the degree of decentralization,
the higher is the inflation (Bojanic 2016; Vázquez &
McNab 2006).
What about the effect of fiscal decentralization on
inflation in Indonesia? Although fiscal decentralization has been implemented in Indonesia since 2001
and followed by political decentralization in 2005, to

the best of our knowledge, the empirical evidence
on how decentralization affects inflation remains
limited. Existing studies analyze the impact of decentralization on issues other than inflation, such
as public service deliveries (Abdullah & Stoelwinder
2007; Heywood & Choi 2010; Maharani, Femina,
& Tampubolon 2014), environment (Ardiansyah &
Jotzo 2013; Burgess et al. 2012; McCarthy 2004;
Palmer & Engel 2007; Ribot, Agrawal, & Larson
2006), governance (Henderson & Kuncoro 2011)
and macroeconomic performance (Pepinsky & Wihardja 2011; Tirtosuharto & Adiwilaga 2013; Vidyattama 2013). We only find one study (Tirtosuharto
& Adiwilaga 2013) that analyzes the impact of decentralization on inflation in which they conclude
that fiscal decentralization leads to higher regional
inflation.
While the study on the effect of government spending on regional inflation in Indonesia during decentralization years has been available, there is still a
significant gap left by the existing literature. First,
the existing study (Tirtosuharto & Adiwilaga 2013)
measures fiscal decentralization as the ratio of ratio
provincial government spending to national spending. However, it is not clear whether they include
the spending from district governments within the
province. Given that the district governments in Indonesia are given a more functional assignment,
excluding district governments spending may result
in measurement error in the explanatory variable,
and hence results in a downward bias of the parameter of fiscal decentralization on inflation. Second, if we look at the government spending pattern
in Indonesia, we observe that spending is highly
skewed. Specifically, most governments spend less
in the first and second quarter while in the third and
fourth quarter government spending increases significantly (see table 1). Low spending in the earlier
quarter implies that the amount of public goods–
which potentially have a positive impact on aggregate output–is below the level of what it should have
been otherwise. Combined with an explosive pattern in the later quarters, it will result in even higher
inflation in the later quarters.
There are several potential sources which may
cause government spending to have the above
pattern. First, the administrative problems in disbursing government spending, such as procurement process, intentional delay of claims on government projects by government contractors, etc.
Second, since decentralization was in effect, the
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Table 1: Subnational Government Budget Absorption by Quarter and Type of Expenditure, 2010 - 2014
Cumulative Realization (%)
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Capital Expenditure
Quarter 1
2.677
1.610
5.001
Quarter 2
15.902
11.057
12.877
Quarter 3
39.429
28.826
30.138
Quarter 4
100
100
.
Non-Capital Expenditure
Quarter 1
7.463
6.830
2.715
Quarter 2 30.177
26.343
11.049
Quarter 3 56.157
50.539
22.418
Quarter 4
100
100
.
Source: Author’s calculation from MoF data
Type of Expenditure

Quarter

fiscal capacity of most subnational governments
remains low. On average, the contribution of local
own source revenue in total government budget
is 10.16% in 2014. It means that to finance government spending, most governments rely heavily
on intergovernmental transfer revenues such as
General Block Grant (DAU), Specific Block Grant
(DAK), and Revenue Sharing (DBH). Third, the use
of budget absorption–, i.e., the ratio of actual spending to budgeted spending–in evaluating government
agency performance both at the national and subnational level. A government with lower budget absorption will have a higher probability to be punished
in the subsequent year–in the form of reduction
of intergovernmental revenue, especially DAU and
DAK1 .
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of subnational government expenditure growth
on regional inflation during 2010–2014. Although
Brodjonegoro, Falianty, & Gitaharie (2005) have
concluded that government spending affects regional inflation during 1990–2002, our study differs in two ways. First, we disaggregate the subnational government spending into two categories,
namely capital and non-capital expenditure. We argue that both expenditures have a different effect
on regional inflation because capital expenditure increases the aggregate supply, while non-capital expenditure tends to increase the aggregate demand.
Thus, it is important to distinguish the types of government spending in analyzing regional inflation.
1 The amount of revenue available for DAU and DAK is determined after subtracting central government revenue with central
government fiscal needs and transfer on revenue sharing. Then,
a formula will be applied to determine the intergovernmental revenue distribution among subnational governments. Subnational
governments may regard the availability of DAU and DAK fund
at the central government as a common resource, which must
be utilized to its maximum by each subnational government for
their benefit.

Second, because fiscal decentralization in Indonesia began in 2001, using regional inflation during
1990–2002 as in Brodjonegoro, Falianty, & Gitaharie (2005) implies that the conclusion is mostly
derived from the government spending behavior
during pre-decentralization years.
We expect by using more recent data, and different
types of spending will provide new information on
how subnational government spending affects regional inflation in decentralized years. If inflation is
affected, then correcting spending pattern may help
in lowering regional inflation. The remaining of the
paper is organized as the following. In section II, we
will briefly discuss theoretical consideration of how
government spending affects inflation. Section III
will discuss data sources and empirical strategies,
followed by a discussion on empirical results in Section IV. Finally, Section V will contain the conclusion
and the policy implication.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Theoretical Consideration
The effect of government spending on inflation in
the short run can be explained using simple aggregate demand and aggregate supply schedules
in graph 1. Let SRAS represents the short run aggregate supply, and SRAD represents the short
run aggregate demand of the economy. A shock–
denoted by δ –can enter either in the SRAD, SRAS,
or both. In the absence of shock in both SRAS and
SRAD (δ  0), the short run equilibrium of output
and price level will be at Y and P respectively2 . A
2 The equilibrium output reflects the output at full employment
level in the short run, which is the output when unemployment is
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shock from SRAD may come from any component
of aggregate spending, one of which is government
spending. If the government spends exactly by the
amount of what is planned in the budget, the shock
equals to zero3 .

3. Method
3.1. Data and Empirical Strategy
Our empirical specification is described by the following equation

Although there is no shock in government spending
on an annual basis, there may be shocks on the
quarterly basis. Since the amount of spending is
tied by the planned (annual) budget, any positive
shock in a given quarter must be balanced with
a negative shock in the other quarter to keep the
government spending at its planned level. For instance, if for any reason a government experiences
difficulties in spending in the earlier quarter which
results in lower spending than its optimal level, it
must be accompanied by a higher spending in the
later quarters. If this happens, negative shock occurs (δ 0) in the earlier quarter will shift SRAD to
SRAD and the equilibrium of output and aggregate
price level will be at Y" and P". In the later quarter, positive shock will occur (δ ¡ 0) causing the
aggregate demand to shift to SRAD’ and results in
different the equilibrium (Y’ and P’). An increased
in the government spending to compensate a lower
spending in the earlier quarters implies that the
growth of government spending varies across the
quarters. Specifically, government spending grows
at a lower rate in the earlier quarters, and it will grow
at a higher rate in the later quarters. Consequently,
the output and price level will grow at a different rate
across quarters, which will be tested empirically in
section IV.

at the natural rate.
3 It is possible that the government spending is intended
to absorb any economic shock. However, the response of
subnational government spending to any economic shock
depends on their fiscal capacity. Any increase in the government
spending (required to overcome the effect of the negative
shock in the economy) is limited by the fiscal capacity of the
subnational governments. On the other hand, a positive shock
on the economy may not be responded by reducing government spending for two reasons. First, reducing government
spending may result in lower economic growth than it would
be otherwise. Second, the subnational governments have a
greater incentive to achieve a higher government absorption
to avoid penalty from the central government. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that subnational governments with low
budget absorption are penalized, for instance, DKI Jakarta (see
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2016/01/08/11463711/
Penyerapan.Rendah.Pemprov.DKI.Dihukum.Kemendagri)

Inflationit

 f pExpenditureGrowthit , Zit q

(1)

where Inflationit is the percentage change
in Consumer Price Index (CPI) in province
i in quarter t (i.e., quarter-to-quarter basis),
ExpenditureGrowthit is the percentage growth of
quarterly government expenditure in province i in
quarter t –which becomes our variable of interest-,
and Zit is a vector of control variables. The data
for the dependent variable (Inflationit ) comes from
the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).
The raw data on CPI is available for 82 districts
included in the survey of living cost conducted by
BPS during 2000–2014 period. As our analysis is
at the province level, we construct the province CPI
using the population in the respective districts as
the weight.
The data to construct our variable of interest comes
from the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (MoF). We
calculate the growth of government expenditure
from the quarterly realization of the district and
province government budget. There are two variables of interest, namely the growth capital expenditure and the growth of non-capital expenditure.
The need to disaggregate the type of expenditure
is based on the consideration that both expenditures may have a different effect on inflation. Unlike
non-capital expenditure which is more likely to shift
SRAD to the northeast, an increased in the capital
expenditure may increase the capital stock of the
economy (shift the SRAS to the southwest) and
hence reduce the inflationary pressure.
To account for other factors affecting regional inflation, we use provincial unemployment rate, nominal
exchange rate, central bank interest rate (BI rate),
and three dummy variables (quarter dummies) as
the control variables4 . The data on unemployment
4 As we have included regional unemployment, nominal exchange rate, the central bank, and quarter dummies, we cannot
use time specific effect to account any unobserved economic
shock in a given time. We argue that the extent bias due to the
exclusion of unobserved economic shock decreases by including
these regional and macro variables.
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Figure 1:

rate comes from BPS and is included to account
the possibility of a trade-off between inflation and
unemployment (i.e., Phillips curve). The nominal
exchange rate and BI rate data comes from Bank
of Indonesia and measured by their respective average value in a given quarter. Both variables are
included as any changes in these variables may
shift both SRAD and SRAS, which may result in
different aggregate price equilibrium. To account
any other factors that may influence inflation rate
on a quarterly basis, we use three dummy quarter
variables. The first dummy (Q2) equals to one if it
is in the second quarter and zero otherwise. The
second dummy (Q3) takes the value of one in the
third quarter and zero for the other quarters. The
last dummy (Q4) takes the value of one in the last
quarter and zero for the other quarters.
Because the inflation rate is calculated by the percentage change in the CPI, inflation in the current
quarter implies that the de-numerator used in calculating the inflation in the next quarter will be higher.
As a consequence, it is very likely that the current inflation is correlated with the past inflation. The presence of lagged dependent variable in both random
effect and fixed effect estimation will result in biased
parameter estimates due to the violation of strict exogeneity assumption. Thus, we use Arellano Bond
GMM estimation because it yields a consistent parameter in the presence of correlation between the
current and the past inflation.
The data on government spending are missing in a
given quarter for some observations. In such cases,
all observations the respective fiscal year are ex-

cluded. We also find that some observations with
extreme growth in which the spending in a given
quarter is higher than 75% of the annual spending.
However, we do not have any information why such
extreme differences occur. Dropping the observations in which the spending in a particular quarter
exceed 75% of the total annual spending may reduce the inefficiency problems due to extreme values, yet it poses sample selection problem. Thus,
we run regressions with two set of samples, i.e.,
the sample without any missing information in a
given fiscal year (i.e., full sample), and the sample
in which we exclude the observations that contain a
spending in a particular quarter exceeding 75% of
the annual budget (i.e., restricted sample. The descriptive statistics of the both sample are presented
in Table 2.

4. Result and Analysis
4.1. Quarterly Inflation and Government Spending by Region
To identify whether inflation and budget absorption
(hence government spending growth) have different pattern by region, we created seven regions,
namely (1) Sumatera, (2) Java and Bali, (3) Kalimantan, (4) Sulawesi, (5) Papua, (6) Nusa Tenggara and Maluku Islands, and (7) Bangka Belitung
and Riau Islands. The difference between the first
five regions and the last two regions is that the latter consists of many smaller islands. Provinces with
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Inflation (%)
Growth of Capital Expenditure (%)
Growth of Non-Capital Expenditure (%)
Unemployment Rate (%)
Exchange Rate (IDR/USD)
BI Rate (%)

Full Sample (485 Observations)
Median
Mean
Standard Deviation
1.27
1.48
1.38
196
486
1355
68
120
366
5.37
5.74
2.47
9,086
9,48
857
6.5
6.32
0.51

many smaller islands are more likely to have higher
transportation costs than provinces in major islands
as it requires not only land transportation but also
sea transportation. Consequently, any shock may
result in a different inflation rate.
The average of quarterly inflation and cumulative
budget absorption of provinces within the same regions are presented in Graph 1–3. We observe the
highest inflation occurs in the third quarter. This
may be due to the occurrence of Ramadhan in the
third quarter during 2010–2014. It has been a common phenomenon that inflation during Ramadan
tends to increase in countries where Muslims are
the majority, including Indonesia5 . The second highest inflation occurs in the first quarter (except for
Sumatera). We suspect that higher inflation is due
to a significant increase in the government spending
in the last quarter of the previous year. As observed
in Graph 2 and 3, the budget absorption in the third
quarter only around 40% of the total annual capital
spending and 50% of the total annual non-capital
spending. It means that a large portion of the government budget in the fiscal year is disbursed in
the last quarter, which causes inflationary pressure
in the following quarter. Whether or not our suspicion holds true will be examined in the empirical
investigation.

4.2. Empirical Results
For both datasets, we run three specifications from
the most restricted specification and then gradually move to the unrestricted specification. Specifically, we assume that the parameter of the past
5 Although Muslims refrain from eating and drinking from dawn
to dusk, consumption tends to increase during the Ramadan
and causes a higher inflation (see http://theconversation.com/
why-ramadan-is-a-special-economic-season-inindonesia-43399).

Restricted Sample (307 Observations)
Median
Mean
Standard Deviation
1.14
1.39
1.32
178
258
458
60.9
61.4
102.8
5.33
5.64
2.43
9,363
9,543
862
5.83
6.24
0.548

expenditure growth equals to zero in Specification
1. We then relax the assumption by including the
spending growth in the last quarter (i.e., Specification 2) and spending growth two-quarters ago
(i.e., Specification 3). Adding the past expenditure
growth causes a reduction in the number of samples. Another disadvantage of having an additional
variable is a reduction of the parameter efficiency
(if the additional variable is irrelevant/insignificant).
However, excluding the past spending growth may
increase the risk of omitted variable bias (if it is indeed significant). As omitted variable bias is more
serious than a reduction in the parameter efficiency
caused by the inclusion of irrelevant variables, we
still use the most restricted specification. By presenting the results from the most restricted to the
least restricted, we will be able to see the consistency of our variable of interest.
The regression results using different specification
are presented in Table 3. We can see that the inflation in past quarter is negatively correlated with
the current inflation rate in all regressions. Higher
inflation in the last quarter will be followed by a
lower inflation in the current quarter. In contrast, a
lower inflation in the last quarter will be followed
by a higher inflation in the current quarter. The results imply that inflation varies across the quarters.
Another indication that inflation fluctuates across
the quarters is the coefficients of quarter dummies,
in which all are significant. Compared to the first
quarter, inflation in the second quarter are lower,
indicated by the negative coefficient of Quarter 1
dummy. A positive parameter of Quarter 3 dummy
indicates that inflation in the third quarter is statistically higher than the inflation in the first quarter. As
we have explained earlier, the result may be due
to the occurrence of Ramadan in the third quarter
during 2010–2014. The inflation in the last quarter
is statistically lower than the first quarter, indicated
by the negative parameter of Quarter 4 dummy.
The parameter of capital expenditure growth in the
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current quarter is positive and significant in affecting the quarterly inflation in three out of six specifications. Using full sample, a percentage growth
of the capital spending increases inflation rate (in
the same quarter) by approximately 0.01%, ceteris
paribus. However, when we include the growth of
capital expenditure two-quarters ago, the parameter
becomes insignificant. We argue the change in the
parameter significance is caused by two reasons.
Frist, the reduction of the sample from 447 (Specification 1) to 379 observations (Specification 3).
Second, the growth of capital expenditure is indeed
not a determinant variable of the current inflation,
such that the inclusion of this variable which results
in the loss of parameter efficiency.
The parameter of non-capital expenditure growth
in the current quarter is positive and significant in
all specifications. The parameter magnitude of noncapital expenditure growth is approximately four
times of the parameter of capital expenditure growth.
An additional growth of non-capital expenditure will
result in a 0.037 percent increase in the inflation
(Specification 1 in the full sample). Under Specification 3 (full sample), the parameter magnitude
increases to 0.075. Although the efficiency of the
parameter of non-capital expenditure growth does
not reduce, the parameter may be biased due as
15 percent of the sample used in Specification 1 is
excluded.
The following argument can explain the insignificant
parameter of the past expenditure growth. First, the
regression result in Specification 1 indicates that
the growth both types of expenditure affect inflation
in the same quarter. Second, the effect of current
expenditure growth on the next quarter inflation has
already been accounted by the inclusion of lagged
dependent variable. Thus, including the past expenditure growth along with the lagged dependent
variable will result in an insignificant parameter of
the past expenditure growth. Including the past government expenditure causes not only a reduction in
the number of observation, but also a reduction in
the efficiency due to a redundant variable. Based
on the above argument, we consider that Specification 1 (full sample) should be used for inference
purpose.
The parameter of unemployment is positive and significant, instead of negative as suggested by the
Phillips curve. One possible explanation on why a
positive association between unemployment and

inflation occurs is the presence of oil price shock
(Friedman 1977). A shock in the oil price would shift
the SRAS to the northwest, causing a reduction
in the output (thus higher unemployment) and increased in the aggregate price (inflation). During
our observation period, the government increased
the fuel price in 2013 and 20146 . Another possible
source of a positive association between unemployment and inflation is the increased in the minimum
wage. The average (monthly) minimum wage in Indonesia increased from IDR 0.99 million in 2010 to
IDR 1.58 million in 20147 . The increase in the minimum wage would cause an upward shift of firms’
cost function. At the aggregate level, SRAS would
contract, and the new equilibrium will occur at in
higher inflation and higher unemployment.
The parameter of the nominal exchange rate is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that currency depreciation increases regional inflation. However, BI rate is insignificant in determining the inflation rate. We argue that the insignificant
effect of BI rate is due to high correlation between
exchange rate and BI rate8 . The central bank will
take any necessary policy to stabilize the exchange
rate9 , one of which is through BI rate. The central
bank will set a higher BI rate if there is a pressure
for the Rupiah to depreciate, and a lower BI rate if
the Rupiah tends to appreciate. As a result, there
will be a positive correlation between BI rate and
nominal exchange rate.

5. Conclusion and Policy Implication
It is a common perception that higher inflation decreases the social welfare as it reduces consumers’
purchasing power. Existing studies have indicated
that short run fluctuation in the aggregate demand
and aggregate supply will result in changes in the
aggregate price level (hence, inflation). In this study,

6 In Indonesia, the fuel price is determined by the government
instead of through market mechanism.
7 The average monthly minimum wage is available at https:
//www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/917
8 The correlation coefficient of BI rate and Nominal exchange
rate is 0.7124
9 One of the central bank functions as stipulated in Law No
3/2004 is exchange rate stabilization
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Table 3: Regression Results

Inflation t-1
Growth of Capital Expenditure t

1
-0.307
(6.02)***
0.010
(1.97)**

Growth of Capital Expenditure t-1
Growth of Capital Expenditure t-2
Growth of Non-Capital Expenditure t

Full Sample
2
3
-0.296
-0.320
(5.69)***
(5.85)***
0.009
0.007
(1.73)*
(1.19)
-0.004
-0.006
(0.73)
(1.06)
-0.002

0.037
(1.81)*

0.041
(1.94)*
0.002
(0.07)

0.170
(2.01)**
0.001
(6.26)***
0.070
(0.57)
-0.573
(3.53)***
0.921
(5.75)***
-0.607
(3.23)***
-4.415
(4.44)***
447

0.167
(1.82)*
0.000
(5.69)***
0.074
(0.59)
-0.681
(3.57)***
0.911
(5.38)***
-0.655
(3.27)***
-4.101
(3.84)***
413

Growth of Non-Capital Expenditure t-1
Growth of Non-Capital Expenditure t-2
Unemployment Rate t
Nominal Exchange Rate t
BI Rate t
Quarter 2 Dummy
Quarter 3 Dummy
Quarter 4 Dummy
Constant
Observation

0.075
(2.99)***
0.024
(1.00)
0.000
(0.01)
0.063
(0.65)
0.001
(5.84)***
0.105
(0.79)
-0.678
(3.36)***
0.712
(3.91)***
-0.639
(3.08)***
-3.984
(3.69)***
379

Restricted Sample
1
2
3
-0.267
-0.245
-0.245
(4.28)***
(3.82)***
(3.77)***
0.021
0.009
0.011
(1.95)*
(0.80)
(1.01)
-0.017
-0.013
(1.58)
(1.32)
-0.001
0.045
(1.80)*

0.064
(2.46)**
0.037
(1.48)

-0.031
(0.31)
0.000
(3.33)***
0.144
(0.96)
-0.799
(4.26)***
0.658
(3.50)***
-0.721
(3.52)***
-2.637
(2.07)**
299

-0.026
(0.26)
0.000
(2.90)***
0.164
(1.07)
-0.820
(3.89)***
0.689
(3.52)***
-0.718
(3.27)***
-2.346
(1.82)*
291

0.048
(1.89)*
0.021
(0.84)
-0.003
(0.13)
-0.033
(0.33)
0.000
(2.77)***
0.178
(1.10)
-0.830
(3.74)***
0.666
(3.32)***
-0.696
(3.06)***
-2.308
(1.76)*
283
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we have shown that the subnational government
spending absorption is low in the first and second
quarter but then increases significantly in the third
and last quarter. This results in high variation of
government spending growth. Our empirical results
indicate that a higher expenditure growth leads to
higher inflation. The same percentage increase in
non-capital expenditure leads to a higher regional
inflation than the growth of capital expenditure.
Although the responsibility of price stabilization
(hence, maintaining lower inflation) is mainly borne
by the central bank of Indonesia, price stabilization will be more difficult to achieve if government
spending remains in its current pattern. Our result
implies that improving budget absorption may help
in lowering inflation. This can be done through (1)
eliminating administrative problems that result in
lower budget absorption in the earlier quarters, and
(2) eliminating the incentives to spend excessively
(especially non-capital spending) just to achieve
higher budget absorption. Under the current system, the intergovernmental transfer is considered as
a common resource, and larger intergovernmental
transfer will increase social welfare at the subnational level. The subnational governments have a
higher incentive to spend as close as they can to
the planned budget regardless whether or not the
spending has a positive impact in production capacity of the district. Thus, we argue that it is important
for the central government to reconsider the current
incentive mechanism in determining intergovernmental transfer.
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